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REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 
I. THE CLOUDS CONCEDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court granted this interlocutory appeal to 
address the four issues presented in the City's Petition, the Clouds acknowledge only one 
of them. Conspicuously absent from the Clouds' opposition brief is any effort to defend 
the various claims that they chose to bring against the City. Rather, the Clouds mention 
these claims only in passing (at 7-8), barely acknowledging that these are the only claims 
they have left against the City. 
This is, of course, entirely consistent with the Clouds' non-opposition to summary 
judgment below. The Clouds' failure to engage the City's arguments and to defend their 
actual claims at any level, either below or on appeal, lends itself to one conclusion: They 
concede that denial of summary judgment was in error. They concede that their contract 
claims are meritless and, consequently, that their initial action in obtaining a restraining 
order against the City on the basis of these contract claims was wrongful. They concede 
that they never submitted a proper notice of claim as required by the Immunity Act. And 
they concede that their tort claims are otherwise barred under the substantive provisions 
of the Immunity Act. Accordingly, and for that reason alone, the Court can and should 
reverse the trial court's denial of the City's summary judgment motion. 
II. RULE 56(t) IS NOT A TOOL TO PROTECT A PARTY FROM LOSING 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As they did below, the Clouds go all-in with Rule 56( f) on appeal. Except now 
they justify their motion and the trial court's grant of Rule 56(±) relief, as well as its 
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simultaneous denial of the City's summary judgment motion, on the language in Rule 
56( f) that the trial court "may make such other order as is just," Utah R. Civ. P. 56( f). In 
essence, the Clouds argue that this language vests a trial court with unlimited, unfettered 
discretion to allow a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment without ever having to address 
or even justify the claims that the plaintiff brought against the defendant and which are at 
issue in the defendant's summary judgment motion. Moreover, specific to this case, the 
Clouds argue that this language vests a trial court with unlimited, unfettered discretion to 
circumvent the Legislative will and this Court's precedent; to continue to assert 
jurisdiction over claims to which it has no jurisdiction; and to "allow a full evaluation" of 
futuristic claims that have not yet "ripened." Rule 56( f) allows no such thing. 
As set forth below in Point A, the Clouds' arguments ignore the body of case law 
governing the qualifications for and appropriate use of Rule 56( f); ignore this Court's 
holding in Jensen v. Smith, 2007 UT App 152, 163 P.3d 657, which disallows what the 
Clouds sought and obtained; and ignore Rule 56( f)'s plain language which provides that a 
trial court may make "such other order as is just" not as an end in itself but only after the 
party seeking the continuance has met its burden of demonstrating that it cannot "present 
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition" to summary judgment, see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56( f)-something the Clouds have never done (and cannot do). 
Moreover, and on that score, the Clouds' conclusory assertion (at 16) that there are "15 
allegations of fact" in the City's summary judgment motion that are "directly affected by 
the trial court's de novo review of the Fire Board's decision," is sophistry. Thus, in Point 
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B below, we do what the Clouds do not: We provide those 15 statements to show that 
there is no chance of them affecting the outcome of summary judgment. In short, the trial 
court's inclusion of Rule 56(f) in its order does nothing to insulate its improper denial of 
summary judgment. Rather, summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. 
A. The Clouds' Interpretation of Rule 56(10 Has No Support in the 
Language of the Rule or in Case Law Interpreting the Rule. 
1. Rule 56(t)'s "such other as is just" language does not vest a trial 
court with a catch-all, standardlt~ss method to deny summary 
judgment and order the parties to trial. 
The Clouds point to Rule 56( f)'s "such other order as is just" language and leap to 
the conclusion that it must mean that a trial court has absolute and unchecked discretion 
to "allow a full evaluation of a party's claims." (Cloud Br. at 13.) On that basis-the 
argument goes-the trial court was within its discretion in denying the City's summary 
judgment motion and granting a continuance-not so the Clouds could procure the 
missing affidavit to defeat summary judgment-but so the Clouds can force the City to 
trial. Not so. 
a. An order that protects a party from summary judgment is 
not "just." 
The Clouds cite to no case in which the Utah Supreme Court or this Court have 
determined the meaning of Rule 56( f)'s "such other order as is just" language. But 
whatever its outer limits, the Court need not explore it here, because this Court has 
already held that Rule 56(f) relief is not appropriate-i.e., not just-if it does nothing 
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more than protect a party from an adverse summary judgment ruling. See Jensen, 2007 
UT App 152, ~ 2; Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Somewhat remarkably, just as the Clouds refuse to address the merits of their 
underlying claims, they also refuse to address Jensen. Yet, they do not deny that their 
Rule 56( f) motion sought and obtained what this Court has forbidden: An order 
protecting them from an adverse summary judgment ruling. See Jensen, 2007 UT App 
152, ~ 2. 
Moreover, the Clouds do not once justifY the trial court's actions in the face of the 
immunity issues that are the flashpoint of this appeal and the City's summary judgment 
motion. The Clouds do not explain how an order that circumvents the Legislative will by 
allowing a trial court to continue to assert jurisdiction over claims for which it does not 
and has never had subject matter jurisdiction and which are otherwise stillborn as a result 
of the procedural and substantive provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is 
somehow "just." 
Indeed, while they cloak themselves in the "such other order as is just" language, 
the Clouds fail to explain what it means, how to apply it, and where this Court should 
place the legal limits of what constitutes a "just" order. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1994) ("[I]t is our role as an appellate court to define what the law is, and 
we never defer to any degree to a trial court on that count."). 
Nor do the Clouds explain how this unlimited and unfettered discretion works in 
the face of Rule 56( c) which directs that "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
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pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issm: as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c) 
(emphasis added). Quite simply, if summary judgment is warranted, and it is here, it 
shall be entered. See Stevens v. La Verkin City, 2008 UT App 129, ,-r 18, 183 P.3d 1059 
("Failure to produce acceptable evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact 
will result in a grant of summary judgment.") (citation and quotation omitted). 
Consequently, an order cannot be "just" if it avoids what Rule 56( c) demands. 
This Court's decision in Jensen recognizes this very thing. If summary judgment 
is warranted, it should be granted. And Rule 56( f) camtot be wielded for no other 
purpose than to protect a party from an adverse summary judgment ruling. As borne out 
by the Clouds' brief, that was the only purpose for the inclusion of Rule 56( f) language in 
the trial court's order in this case. 
b. A "just" order under Rul•~ 56(t) is one that sets the limits 
of discovery for the purpose of opposing summary 
judgment. 
For that reason alone, the Court can dispense with the Clouds' Rule 56( f) 
arguments. But if the Court desires to further examine the "such order as is just 
language" in the rule, it will not find the vague and standardless catchall that the Clouds 
argue justifies denial of summary judgment in favor of a trial for a "full evaluation" of 
their claims. Rather, it will find that the language is simply a means to impose specific 
conditions on the party obtaining the Rule 56( f) continuance to conduct discovery. 
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Specifically, courts interpreting the "such other order as is just" language in Rule 
56( f) interpret it as allowing the trial court to impose conditions on the party obtaining a 
Rule 56( f) continuance which are specific to obtaining information during discovery in 
order to present an opposition to summary judgment. See Patty Precision v. Brown & 
Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1984). 1 ''Those conditions have 
required that discovery be completed within a specified time, that the scope, issues or 
persons available for discovery be limited, or that the [Rule 56( f)] movant be required to 
reimburse expenses." Jd. at n.3 (citing lOA C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure Civil2d § 2740 at 539 (1983)). It also allows for denial of the Rule 56( f) 
request subject to later application and a more detailed explanation as to why an affidavit 
in opposition to summary judgment could not be obtained. See Wright & Miller, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 27 40 (3d ed. Westlaw 2011) ("Courts also have 
withheld action or denied a Rule 56( f) request without prejudice to a reapplication 
accompanied by a fuller explanation ofwhy affidavits opposing the motion could not be 
presented."). 
This confirms that, contrary to the Clouds' arguments, the "such other order as is 
just" language in Rule 56( f) is not an end in itself. It follows the requirement that the 
party seeking Rule 56( f) protection first make a threshold showing that they cannot 
1 "Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54,~ 7 n.2, 53 P.2d 947 (citation omitted). 
Federal Rule 56( d), which was formerly Federal Rule 56(f), is similar to Utah's Rule 
56(f). See Utah R. Civ. P. 56 compiler's notes. 
6 
presently oppose summary judgment: "Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may ... may make such other order as 
is just." Utah R. Civ. P. 56( f). That is, the opposing party must first identify specific 
facts that he or she intends to obtain that would preclude entry of summary judgment. 
See Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55,~~ 23-27, 192 P.3d 858. 
Without that showing, a trial court cannot make "such other order as it just." Rather, the 
only appropriate order is one denying the Rule 56( f) motion as "futile." Id. ~ 23. 
In other words, Rule 56( f) does not allow a trial court to do what the trial court did 
here, deny summary judgment and force a defendant to trial where the party opposing 
summary judgment has not bothered to present specific facts to demonstrate that it can, 
with whatever order the trial court deems ')ust," obtain the missing affidavit or conduct 
discovery in order to create a disputed issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. 
That is outright protection of the party from a summary judgment ruling-something this 
Court has made clear is not within the trial court's discretion. See Jensen, 2007 UT App 
152, ~ 2. 
2. Rule 56(f) is a Device to Identify Specific Facts to Defeat 
Summary Judgment and then Obtain Those Facts Through 
Discovery. 
The Clouds also take issue with the City's characterization of Crossland Savings 
v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994). The Clouds assert that Crossland Savings does not 
stand for the proposition that Rule 56( f)'s sole purpose is to allow a party who cannot 
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present sufficient facts to oppose summary judgment more time to conduct discovery to 
procure facts to mount an opposition to summary judgment. (Cloud Br. at 13-14.) 
Rather, the Clouds assert that in Crossland Savings, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that in ruling on a Rule 56( f) motion the focus should be on the "individual circumstances 
of each case." (Cloud Br. at 15.) Of course, the Clouds fail to provide the entire passage 
from the opinion, which provides the necessary context. The Court actually said that "the 
courts in this state have never established a 'bright line' rulefiw determining when a 
party has had sufficient time to initiate discovery. Instead, we have focused on the 
individual circumstances of each case." Crossland Sav., 877 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis 
added). Indeed, the question in Crossland Savings was whether the party seeking Rule 
56(f) reliefhad been dilatory in seeking discovery. See id. at 1243-1244. Thus, contrary 
to the Clouds' assertions, there was no suggestion in Crossland Savings that in a complex 
case (and this is not one)2 the trial court is free to use Rule 56(f) for whatever purpose 
serves the needs of the party opposing summary judgment. 
In fact-showing once again that Jensen marks the path to dispensing with Rule 
56( f)-in Jensen, this Court rejected the "it's a complex case therefore Rule 56( f) is 
appropriate" argument. See Jensen, 2007 UT App 152, ~ 5. There, this Court affirmed 
denial of a Rule 56( f) motion as "dilatory or lacking in merit" where the plaintiffs 
2 The Clouds continue to argue that the City agrees that this is a complex case "in 
the extreme." (Cloud Br. at 15.) That is false. The City does not agree. As set forth in 
Point III below, the only thing that is complex about this case is the manner in which it 
has been litigated and morphed at every tum to keep alive claims and procedures that 
should be (and are) legally dead. 
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"stated reasons for not being able to produce the necessary evidentiary affidavits were 
merely that the case was too complex ... " !d. ~ 5. The Clouds have not cited any 
authority in their brief to show that the rule is any different if the case is a self-described 
complex case "in the extreme." (Cloud Br. at 15.) 
Rather, any sampling of the opinions from either this Court or the Utah Supreme 
Court reveal that in determining whether Rule 56( f) reEef is appropriate, the focus is 
always on the issue of discovery: 
• Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc.: Affirming denial ofRule 56(f) 
motion where party "failed to identify in its rule 56( f) motion or its 
opposition to [moving party's] motion for summary judgment any discovery 
that would create a material issue of fact which would preclude the granting 
of a summary judgment motion." 2008 UT 55,~ 24, 192 P.3d 858 
• Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.: "To qualify for relief under Rule 56( f), 'the 
opposing party must show to the best of his [or her] ability what facts are 
within the movant's exclusive knowledge or control; what steps have been 
taken to obtain the desired information pursuant to discovery procedures 
under the Rules; and that [ s ]he is desirous of taking advantage of these 
discovery procedures."' 745 P.2d 838, 840-41 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice~ 56.24 (2d ed.1987)) 
• Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry: instructing the trial court to "examine 
( 1) whether the party submitting the motion is merely attempting to gain 
'additional discovery time to uncover purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has already been conducted,' and (2) 'whether the other 
party has appropriately responded to discovery requests."' 2001 UT App 
397, ~ 9, 38 P.3d 984 (quoting Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 
639 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
To be sure, and though we are not aware of a Utah case (and the Clouds provide 
none), there may be circumstances where something other than discovery warrants Rule 
56( f) relief. For example, discovery may not be needed to procure a necessary affidavit. 
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See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 56( f) (providing that the court may ... order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained"). One can surmise a situation in which a party opposing 
summary judgment needs to locate a key witness who has disappeared but can provide 
the crucial affidavit that will be the direct counter needed to defeat summary judgment. 
But even in that case, the continuance is tethered to Rule 56(f)'s express language 
that the continuance is sought for the purpose of obtaining facts necessary and essential to 
justify the opposition to summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56( f). That is, after all, 
the purpose of Rule 56( f). The rule is summary judgment specific. It requires an 
explanation in "an affidavit stating reasons why the party is presently unable to submit 
evidentiary affidavits in opposition to the moving party's supporting affidavits." 
Crossland Sav., 877 P.2d at 1243. The Clouds cite to no case or other authority 
suggesting that it is something that allows "a full evaluation of a party's claims"-which 
in this case is code for "simply deny summary judgment and give us a trial." More 
importantly, the Clouds cite to no authority that allows a trial court to ignore basic 
jurisdictional and immunity issues-issues that affect the public health, safety, and 
welfare-so that a plaintiff can have its day in court. Here, as detailed in the City's 
opening brief, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to their day in court on the claims that they 
have chosen to assert against the City. 
B. The Facts Are What the City Says They Are: Undisputed. 
This brings us to the Clouds' argument that there are "outstanding issues of 
disputed fact which preclude[]" summary judgment. (Cloud Br. at 15.) The Clouds do 
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not present a single argument, fact, or otherwise that shows that if they were given a 
trial-this de novo review-that they could somehow defeat summary judgment. For 
starters, the trial court already simply denied the City's summary judgment without ever 
requiring the Clouds to make a single substantive argument in opposition. The Clouds 
act as though this never happened. It did, and it was enor. 
In any event, the Clouds argue that "[i]t is clear that the trial court must first 
complete its review of that [the Fire Board's] determination so that the parties know 
precisely what the Fire Code's application is in this case." (Cloud Br. at 14.) They do 
not explain why this is clear. They do not explain how a de novo review of the Fire 
Board's decision will reverse this Court's decision in Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 
UT App 11, 155 P.3d 900, and turn their building permit into a contract to save their 
contract claims. They do not explain how a de novo review of the Fire Board's decision 
will save them from their failure to file a proper and timely notice of claim-ten years 
after the fact. Nor do the Clouds explain how a de novo review of the Fire Board's 
decision will amend the substantive provisions of the Immunity Act to "un-waive" the 
immunity that the Legislature reserved to the City. 
Indeed, while the Clouds demand a trial in order to "fully examine" their claims, 
they have not once, either below or on appeal, expressed any interest in examining those 
claims on the merits and against the undisputed facts and arguments advanced by the 
City. Rather, their brief merely confirms what the City argued below and on appeal: The 
Rule 56( f) motion was nothing more than an effort to avoid summary judgment and 
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protect the Clouds from an adverse ruling that is mandated by the undisputed facts and 
governing law. 
The Clouds' steadfast and consistent refusal to address any of these issues on the 
merits demonstrates that they have no answer to any of these questions. So instead, the 
Clouds offer up generalities. They argue there are "fifteen (15) allegations of fact" in the 
City's summary judgment that are "directly affected by the trial court's de novo review of 
the Fire Board's decision." (Cloud Br. at 15-16.) Then, they jump to the conclusion that 
these 15 issues "targets core issues that [the Clouds] believe soundly defeats the pending 
summary judgment motion." (Cloud Br. at 16.) The Clouds do not tell us what those 15 
"allegations of fact" are. Nor do they explain how they soundly defeat the City's 
summary judgment motion. We will. And they do not. 
The 15 statements referred to by the Clouds in their brief direct the Court to the 
Record at 207D-F. (Cloud Br. at 16.) There the Court will find the Clouds' reply 
memorandum where they first identified these 15 statements. (R. 207D-F.) What the 
Court will not find, however, is what it will not find in the Clouds' brief: an explanation 
as to how a de novo review will provide the necessary direct counter to any of these 15 
statements. "As the Utah Supreme Court has made clear, facts asserted in support of a 
motion for summary judgment remain undisputed '" [ a]bsent a direct counter."' 
Wilkinson v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 56,~ 8, 230 P.3d 136 (quoting Johnson v. 
Hermes Assocs., Ltd., 2005 UT 82, ~ 24, 128 P .3d 1151 ). Moreover, the Court will not 
find any explanation as to how any of these facts are within the City's "exclusive 
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knowledge or control," which is a necessary prerequisite to qualifying for Rule 56( f) 
relief, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, 2001 UT App 397, ~ 9. 
This is because these statements fall into one or more of four categories: 
1. The Clouds' own deposition testimony; 
2. The deposition testimony of expert witnesses for both parties (Reginald 
Edwards and Lee Scarlett for the Cloud; and Bradley Larson for the City); 
3. The deposition testimony of City employees and officials, taken under 
examination and questioning from the Clouds' attorneys; and 
4. Direct quotations from either the Fire Code itself or the Fire Board's 
decision. These statements merely state what the Fire Code provides or 
what the Fire Board held-not some deduction or disputable implication 
from these sources. 
THE "15 STATEMENTS" 
Note that the referenced paragraph numbers are those assigned by the City in its 
summary judgment motion. The citations are those utilized by the City in 
making these statements, in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). 
<[13 Given the height of the warehouse area, Plainliffs' intent (as evidenced by 
their actions) was to stack the vaults two to three high to maximize their 
warehouse space and, consequently, their profits. Cloud Dep. 42:16-20) 
(testifying on December 29, 2003, that Plaintiffs were "only" stacking the 
vaults "two high," because at the time they did not "even have enough to fill 
the floor up."); Edwards Dep. 74-75 (testifying that in January 2006 Plaintiffs 
were still utilizing their building as high-piled combustible storage because 
they had the vaults stacked two high in excess of 12-feet in height); Larson 
Dep. 19-20, Ex. 1 Inspection Report (testifying that, in September 2005, 
conditions were observed in the warehouse of storage between 14 and 16 feet 
in height); Fire Board Ruling, Finding of Fact '][3 (finding: "Mrs. Cloud 
testified that the intended use of the building was for high pile storage. The 
building has been used for high pile storage and was properly designated as 
such on January 3, 2002.) 
<[14 Stacked two-high, the vaults measure 14-feet in height. 
(Cloud Dep. 42:16-25, 43:1-3.) 
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117 Around the same time, the City requested that its fire chief, Dwayne Isom, 
inspect the building for fire code compliance. (Isom Dep. 9:23-25, 10, 11:1-8; 
see also Cloud Dep. 58-59.) 
119 Chief Isom made the determination that Plaintiffs' intended use of their 
building constituted ''high-piled combustible storage area" under section 
8101.2.2 of the 1997 Uniform Fire Code. (Isom Dep. 43-58.) 
120 The Uniform Fire Code defines "High-Piled Combustible Storage" as: 
"storage of combustible materials in closely packed piles or combustible 
materials on pallets, in racks or on shelves, where the top of the storage is 
greater than 12 feet (3658 mm) in height." 1997 Uniform Fire Code§ 209-H. 
121 Because Chief Isom determined that Plaintiffs' use constitutes a high-piled 
combustible storage area within the meaning of the fire code, and because the 
building is approximately 10,000 square feet in area, he determined that the 
fire code required Plaintiffs' building to have an automatic sprinkling system. 
(Isom Dep. 43:4-12.) 
123 As a result, Chief Isom did not pass the building on its final inspection. 
(Isom Dep. 43:4-12.) 
124 Because the building did not pass its final inspection, the City did not issue a 
final certificate of occupancy for the building. (Bulloch Dep. 17-22; see also 
Am. Compl. 146.) 
125 The fire code provides for an additional option for high-piled storage in lieu 
of an automatic fire sprinkling system. This option-known as Option 2-
requires installation of: (i) a compliant fire detection system; (ii) appropriate 
building access; (iii) a compliant smoke and removal system; (iv) curtain 
boards; and (v) small hose and valve stations. See 1997 Uniform Fire Code, 
Table 81-A (vol. I 1997). 
126 Plaintiffs' building did not (and does not) have all of these items installed in 
lieu of a fire sprinkling system. (Edwards Dep. 46-48, 61-64; Larson Dep. 
15:21-25, 16-28, & Ex. 1; Scarlett Dep. 36.) 
133 Plaintiffs believe the decision to require an automatic fire sprinkling system in 
their building was the right decision. However, they take issue with the 
timing of the decision and the failure to include the fire chief in the approval 
and inspection process. (Cloud Dep. 74:10-22.) 
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153 The Board ultimately ruled that Plaintiffs' building was not in compliance 
with the fire code at the time of the January 3, 2002 inspection and therefore 
the City's "denial of a Certificate of Occupancy was based on a factually 
correct finding that the building was not in compliance with the 1997 Uniform 
Fire Code requirements." Fire Board Ruling at 3 112, 7. 
'.1[54 The Board also granted Plaintiffs a temporary certificate of occupancy for a 
one year period of time. See Fire Board Ruling at 4. 
'.1[55 During this time period, Plaintiffs were required to keep their storage below 
12-feet in height; store only certain commodities; post appropriate signage; 
and do what is necessary to come into compli<mce with the fire code, at which 
time they would receive a permanent certificate of occupancy. See id. 
(R. 207D-F.) 
With these statements in plain view, the Clouds' conclusory assertion that these 
statements are "directly affected" by a de novo review, and that the de novo review must 
take place before they can defend or prove up their contract and tort claims is a work of 
fiction. Are the Clouds suggesting that they will simply commit perjury at trial and 
change their sworn deposition testimony? Are they suggesting that at trial the provisions 
of the Uniform Fire Code will not state what they state now? And exactly which of these 
statements is within the City's "exclusive knowledge or control?" The answer is simple, 
none of them. To accept the Clouds' argument-and the trial court's order-would mean 
that Rule 56( f) can now be applied not only to allow for more time to conduct discovery 
and procure missing affidavits, but to avoid over seven years' worth of full discovery and 
depositions, including dodging a party's own sworn deposition testimony, so they can 
argue their case all over again at trial in the hopes that the facts and law will be different. 
That cannot be law. 
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These are the undisputed facts that were developed after full discovery and 
depositions. There is no possibility of the Clouds providing legitimate and direct counter 
to any of them. The Clouds' arguments merely confirm that the trial court's Rule 56(f) 
order "exceed[ed] 'the limits of reasonability."' Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 
26, ~ 9, 995 P.2d 1237 (quoting Crossland Sav., 877 P.2d at 1243). 
III. THE DE NOVO REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES ACT IS IRRELEVANT TO THE CITY'S MOTION. 
This case is not, as the Clouds argue, complex "in the extreme." The Clouds and 
the trial court have only made it appear so. And the Clouds' demand that the Court allow 
them to keep alive meritless and stillborn claims so they can have their de novo review is 
without merit as the de novo review is irrelevant to the Clouds' tort and contract claims. 
It is clear that the Clouds do not fully grasp the difference between the administrative 
procedures and the Immunity Act that forms the basis of the City's summary judgment 
motion. 
A. The De Novo Review Has Nothing to do With the Tort and Contract 
Claims at Issue in the City's Summary Judgment Motion. 
As detailed in the City's opening brief, the City has retained immunity from suit 
against the Clouds' tort claims. See Utah Code§§ 63-30-10(3), (4). The reasons for this 
immunity are anchored in the public safety, health, and welfare. See DeEry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428 (Utah 1985). So, too, is the reason that building permits do not and cannot 
create contractual obligations. See Heideman, 2007 UT App 11. In short, the damages 
the Clouds seek for their tort and contract claims are not available to them. A de novo 
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review of the Fire Board's decision cannot change this fact. Rather, as explained in 
footnote 12 of our opening brief, no damages are available in a de novo review of an 
administrative appeal. See Utah Code§ 63G-4-404(1)(a) (2008). 
The only purpose for an administrative appeal is to determine if government erred 
in, for example, not granting a certificate of occupancy or other permit. In other words, it 
allows government the opportunity to correct its own errors. See Holladay Town Center, 
LLC v. Holladay City, 2008 UT App 301, ~ 8, 192 P.3d 302. The remedy is purely 
equitable. For example, in this case it led the Fire Prevention Board to issue the 
certificate of occupancy with certain conditions. There is nothing exceptional or 
extraordinary about this process. And the Clouds' bald assertions that the City agrees 
with their claim about this being an amazingly complex and extraordinary case are just 
that-bald assertions that are not reflected in the record or reality. 
In fact, if there is anything exceptional about this case it is that there were so many 
different appeals procedures available to the Clouds to obtain review of the City's 
decisions. But the Clouds never once bothered to timely invoke any of them. As the 
U.S. District Court explained: 
First, § 103.1.4 of the Uniform Fire Code establishes a board of appeals that could 
have interpreted the fire code and rendered a favorable decision to the Clouds in 
regards to Chiefisom's determinations. Nevertheless, the Clouds did not appeal to 
that body. Second, under Utah administrative law, "[i]f a city, county, or fire 
protecting district refuses to establish a method of appeals regarding a portion of 
the [fire code], the appealing party may petition to the [Utah Fire Prevention 
Board] to act as the board of appeals. Nevertheless, the Clouds did not appeal to 
that board. And last, in accordance with the Utah Municipal Land Use and 
Development Management Act, the Clouds could have appealed Chiefisom's 
decision to the Washington City Board of Adjustment, which as the authority to 
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hear and decide appeals "where it is alleged that there is error in any order, 
requirement, decision or determination made by any administrative official in the 
enforcement of' the zoning ordinances. The Clouds do not dfspute that they did 
not appeal to any of the available boards. 
Cloud v. Washington City, No. 2:04-CV-00246 at 11-12 (D. Utah April 7, 2005). 
The time for the Clouds to appeal to any of these agencies expired in late February 
2002. See Utah Admin. Code R710-9-16.2, 16.3 (appeal must be filed within 20 days 
after receiving decision); Wash. City Zoning Ord. § 4-8 (appeal must be filed within 15 
working days of the decision). It was only after the U.S. District Court remanded the 
state contract and tort claims back to the state trial court that the state trial court, sua 
sponte, decided to allow the Clouds a second chance to pursue an administrative appeal, 
long after the time period to do so had expired. This case would be over if the trial court 
had not allowed the Clouds to pursue a dead issue. See, e.g., Meadowbrook, LLC v. 
Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 1998) ("The interests of justice are not enhanced when 
the court exceeds its role as arbiter by reaching out and deciding an issue that would 
otherwise be dead"). Thus, contrary to what the Clouds indicate in their brief, the City 
does not agree that the consolidation of the damages case with the de novo review was 
proper and necessary. In fact, the City has fought this procedure every step of the way.3 
In any event, notwithstanding anything the Clouds have argued, their central 
theme that they are "entitled to a full and comprehensive review" (at 12) in an 
administrative proceeding under the Administrative Procedures Act is not, by any 
3 The City attempted an interlocutory appeal to this Court when the trial court 
allowed the belated appeal to the Fire Prevention Board. The Court denied that petition. 
measure, a valid counter to the City's entitlement not to stand trial on the damages 
claims. To hold otherwise would allow any plaintiff to avoid the Immunity Act by 
simply pursuing both a damages and administrative appeal procedure and claiming that 
the two are related. The Court must reject that argument. 
B. The Clouds' Jurisdictional Argument lVIakes No Sense. 
The Clouds also posit a jurisdictional argument (at 17) that until the de novo 
review occurs 'jurisdiction is absent to even address Washington City's summary 
judgment relief requested." (Cloud Br. at 17 .) This is a fantastic assertion. The City's 
summary judgment motion attacks the claims the Clouds brought against the City.· The 
Clouds, as the plaintiffs, are the masters of their complaint. They decided which claims 
they would bring against the City. Now, eight years in, in a brief before this Court, they 
want to claim that the City is precluded as a jurisdictional matter from defeating those 
claims on summary judgment. 
It is true there is a jurisdictional issue here, but it bars the Clouds' tort claims. It 
does not bar the City from defending against those claims and arguing that they are 
barred under the Immunity Act. 
Further, this is not an appeal of the Fire Prevention Board's decision. This is an 
appeal of the trial court's denial of the City's summary judgment motion which 
challenged the only claims that exist: The Clouds' contract and tort claims. This Court 
plainly has jurisdiction to review that denial. See Utah R. App. P. 5; Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)U). 
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C. The Clouds' "We Need to Ripen Federal Claims" Argument Has 
Nothing to Do with the Issues That Are Already Before the Court. 
The Clouds also assert that they need their de novo review in order to ripen and 
reassert their federal claims. (Cloud Br. at 18-19.) This argument is also without merit. 
Here, we could respond that the federal claims will never ripen and that the trial 
court's decision to allow the administrative appeals procedure in the first instance was 
erroneous.4 We could argue that the Clouds have no chance at recovery because of their 
own failures to pursue obvious administrative remedies. See, e.g., Holladay Town 
Center, LLC, 2008 UT App 301, ~ 8 (holding that a party cannot tum its failure to pursue 
administrative remedies "into a triumph" by skipping those procedures intended to allow 
government to correct its own errors). But arguing over claims that are not even before 
the Court is a purely hypothetical exercise that has no place in this appeal. Indeed, the 
purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to ensure that courts do not get involved in rendering 
advisory opinions on hypothetical questions. See Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Comm 'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981); Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ~~ 92-93, 
269 P.3d 141. 
The Clouds' ripeness argument simply underscores why summary judgment 
should be granted to the City. Instead of defending the claims that are before the Court, 
the Clouds ignore them entirely but ask the Court to let them keep the claims alive so 
that, some point in the future, they can bring a new complaint asserting new claims. 
4 Those arguments are set forth in our objection to the state trial court's order 
sending this case onto the administrative appeals track. SeeR. 164-164R. 
Quite simply, the Clouds' ripeness argument is without merit and presents no basis 
to affirm the trial court's order. 
IV. JUDICIAL ECONOMY DOES NOT DISPLACE JURISDICTION AND 
IMMUNITY PROBLEMS. 
Finally, against the jurisdictional, immunity, and public health, safety, and welfare 
reasons that mandate judgment for the City, the Clouds respond with a judicial economy 
argument. Judicial economy is no basis for a trial court to retain jurisdiction over claims 
for which it has no jurisdiction; force the City to go to trial on claims for which it is 
immune and has a right not to stand trial; and refuse to apply and enforce this Court's 
precedents. 
Furthermore, the judicial economy argument makes no sense. How is having a 
trial to review de novo the Fire Prevention Board's decision, followed by a trial to 
determine damages on the tort and contract claims, followed by a new complaint and 
pleading asserting new claims that have (according to the Clouds) now ripened, in the 
interests of judicial economy? The Clouds can sling whatever accusations and 
insinuations they want concerning the City's summary judgment motion. (Cloud Br. at 
20) (asserting that the City must be "apprehensive" about the trial de novo.) It does not 
change the fact that the City is entitled to summary judgment, here and now, on the only 
claims that exist: the tort and contract claims arising out of and resulting from the City's 
fire code inspection and non-issuance of a certificate of occupancy. 
')1 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in our opening brief, the trial court's order 
should be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter 
judgment for the City on all damages claims asserted in the case. 
DATED THIS 19th day ofMarch 2012. 
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